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On what it is to fly can tell us something about what it is to live
Christophe Malaterre 
Abstract  The  plurality  of  definitions  of  life  is  often  perceived  as  an  unsatisfying 
situation stemming from still incomplete knowledge about ‘what it is to live’ as well as 
from the existence of a variety of methods for reaching a definition. For many, such 
plurality is to be remedied and the search for a unique and fully satisfactory definition 
of life pursued. In this contribution on the contrary, it is argued that the existence of 
such a variety of definitions of life undermines the very feasibility of ever reaching a 
unique unambiguous definition. It is argued that focusing on the definitions of specific 
types of ‘living systems’ – somehow in the same way that one can define specific types 
of ‘flying systems’ – could be more fruitful from a heuristic point of view than looking 
for ‘the’ right definition of life, and probably more accurate in terms of carving Nature 
at its joints.
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Introduction
Definitions of life abound in the literature. Simultaneously, there is much debate among 
scientists and philosophers to find ‘the’ right definition of life. Yet, should we really 
worry about the existence of such a plurality of definitions and work towards a unique 
definition of life? In this contribution, I propose two arguments that account for such a 
diversity of definitions  of life:  a ‘methodological  argument’  that has to  do with the 
methods of definition, and a ‘natural argument’ stemming from research on physico-
chemical  systems at  the border-line between inanimate matter  and life.  I  argue that, 
instead of searching for ‘the’ right definition of ‘life’, one ought to focus on defining 
types of ‘living systems’, for not only living systems might come with varying degrees 
of ‘lifeness’ but also with varying means for achieving this ‘lifeness’. 
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C. Malaterre
On the many definitions of life
The  literature  is  replete  with  definitions  of  life.  Already  in  the  1970s,  Carl  Sagan 
noticed that there was no commonly accepted definition of life and that there was a 
clearly discernible tendency for each biological discipline to define life in its own terms 
(Sagan 1970, 985); at that time, Sagan identified physiological, metabolic, biochemical, 
genetic and thermodynamic  definitions of life.  More recently,  following the work of 
Palyi,  Zucchi  and  Caglioti  (2002,  15-56),  Popa  catalogued  over  ninety  different 
definitions  of  life,  from  the  1850s  to  today  (Popa  2004,  197-205).  Some  of  these 
definitions are rather short, others much more intricate. 
A closer look actually shows that they tend to fall into two broad categories. One 
finds ‘list-based definitions’ that define a living system in terms of a list of putative 
necessary  and  sufficient  properties.  Such  properties  typically  include  growth, 
reproduction,  self-repair,  energy-harnessing  capability,  matter-harnessing  capability, 
variation capability, information capability and so forth (see for instance: Oparin 1961, 
Bernal 1967, Monod 1970, Crick 1981, Mayr 1982, de Duve 1991, Farmer and Belin 
1992, Koshland 2002, Morange 2003). On the other hand, one also finds ‘model-based 
definitions’ that define living systems on the basis of a model that describes the very 
functioning of such living systems (see for instance: Maturana and Varela 1973, Ganti 
[1971] 2003, Ruiz-Mirazo, Pereto and Moreno 2004). In such cases, the properties of 
living systems are only secondary in the sense that they are nothing but a consequence 
of the functioning of the model. Whichever way one may adopt to classify definitions of 
life, the end-result is straightforward: definitions of life abound. 
Such a situation is  often perceived as being unsatisfactory:  there is  indeed much 
debate about the relative strengths and weaknesses of definitions of life when compared 
to  one  another,  about  the  adequacy  of  such  and  such  definition  when  it  comes  to 
capturing  the  ‘essence’  of  life.  There  is  also  much  debate  about  the  existence  of 
physical, chemical or biological counterexamples that seem to defy both the sufficiency 
and necessity  of  any of  these definitions  (e.g.  Luisi  1998,  Ruiz-Mirazo,  Pereto  and 
Moreno 2004).  Many discussions focus on finding ‘the’ right  definition  of life.  For 
instance, Cleland and Chyba argue that, in order to reach ‘the’ correct definition of life, 
one first needs to have a theory of life, somehow in the same way that one needs a 
molecular theory of water to correctly define water as H20 (Cleland and Chyba 2002). 
And,  besides  intellectual  satisfaction,  specific  motivations  for  finding  ‘the’  right 
definition of life are often put forward, including for instance use in astrobiology (to 
define whether one finds life or not elsewhere than on Earth), use in artificial life (to 
decide whether specific  in silico systems do qualify as being alive or not), or use in 
synthetic biology (to decide whether specific ‘wet’ in vitro systems are alive or not).
In what follows, I argue that there are good reasons for such a plurality of definitions 
of  ‘life’,  and  furthermore  that  the  debate  could  benefit  from  tackling  instead  the 
question of defining ‘types of living systems’.
Definitional pluralism
Two arguments can explain why there is such a plurality of definitions of life: first, a 
‘methodological argument’ that borrows from logic and linguistics, and that concerns 
the art of defining; and second a ‘natural argument’ based on an analysis of the variety 
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of functionalities that can be harnessed to sustain life-like processes1.
The ‘methodological argument’ stems from the simple observation that, there exist, 
in logic and linguistics, quite many methods for reaching definitions of terms, and that 
such methods may generate  indeed quite  distinct  definitions  of any given term.  For 
instance, Clark and Welsh, in their logic manual (1962), list a number of such methods 
and types  of  definitions.  One can  first  distinguish  between  ‘lexical  definitions’  and 
‘stipulative definitions’: whereas the first ones give or explain the meaning of a word by 
referring to the linguistic usage of this very word by certain people at certain places and 
times, the second ones deliberately assign a meaning to a word (Clark and Welsh 1962, 
175-181). As a matter of fact, ‘stipulative definition’ is the principal sort of defining 
that is at stake when one claims that arguments can be settled by clarifying definitions,  
and, in this respect, the various definitions of life belong to this class of ‘stipulative 
definitions’. But there are also many ways to elaborate a ‘stipulative definition’ of any 
given word. Clark and Welsh catalogue no less than eight methods of definition: the 
‘synonymous method’, the ‘method of analysis by genus and differentia’, the ‘relational 
or  synthetic  method’,  the  ‘denotative  method’,  the  ‘range  method’,  the  ‘ostensive 
method’,  the  ‘implicit  method’  and even the  so-called  ‘regular  method’  (Clark  and 
Welsh 1962, 182-192)2. As a result,  it  is no surprise that multiple definitions of any 
given term might co-exist. 
Indeed, the variety of methods of definition can certainly explain part of the observed 
plurality of definitions of life: for instance, the approach of many proponents of ‘list-
based definitions’ of life definitely borrows from the ‘method of analysis by genus and 
differentia’ in so far as such definitions list specific properties that are supposed to set 
apart living systems from other types of physico-chemical systems; on the other hand, 
the approach of proponents of ‘model-based definitions’  of  life  is  more  akin to  the 
‘relational or synthetic method’ in so far as living systems are, in this case, defined by 
being related to particular models and their way of functioning. 
The ‘natural argument’ stems from the diversity of physico-chemical systems that 
appear to populate the bordering zone between non-life and life. There is indeed quite a 
wide disagreement  about  whether  certain  systems are alive or not.  One of the most 
frequently discussed cases is  that  of viruses.  For some,  viruses should not count  as 
living systems in so far as they lack proper metabolic activity (see for instance Luisi 
1998,  Ruiz-Mirazo,  Pereto  and  Moreno  2004).  Yet,  for  others,  they  should:  in 
1 It can also be argued, as a third argument, that ‘life’ is a folk concept that does not correspond to a  
natural  kind, and that,  as a result, it  is  no surprise that no right definition of life can be singled out  
(Machery, ms.). In this contribution, I will focus on a more scientific viewpoint.
2 The ‘synonymous method’ consists in defining a word by giving another word which is its synonym 
(‘chat’ in French means ‘cat’ in English); the ‘method of analysis by  genus et differentia’ consists in 
giving the name of a larger class (the genus) of which the thing to be defined is a subclass, and giving a 
property  (differentia)  which  sets  it  off  from  other  members  of  the  larger  class  (a  ‘bachelor’  is  an 
‘unmarried adult man’); the ‘relational or synthetic method’ defines a word by relating the thing meant to 
some other thing we are familiar with (the color ‘blue’ can be correlated with a given set of light waves);  
the ‘denotative method’ proceeds by giving a list of examples of things the word applies to (a ‘card game’ 
is something like bridge, poker or twenty-one); the ‘range method’ defines a paradigm case and deviating 
borderline cases (a ‘Labrador retriever’ can be defined by presenting typical specimens and borderline  
specimens); the ‘ostensive method’ defines a word by presenting an object (‘this is a thermometer’); the  
‘implicit  method’ defines  a  word by using it  (the word ‘hemisphere’  can be defined by saying:  ‘the 
diameter of a circle cuts the circle into two equal hemispheres’); the ‘regular method’ defines a word by 
giving the rule for its use (the rule for ‘we’ is that it is used by the speaker to refer to himself or herself 
and at least one other person). For more details, see for instance Clark and Welsh (1962, 182-192).
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particular, recent research is challenging the traditional view of a virus pictured as a 
rather static strand of nucleic acid encapsulated in a capsid, replacing it by that of a 
quite active and alive ‘viral factory’ (see for instance Forterre 2009, this volume). There 
is also substantial debate about whether self-replicating strands of RNA as hypothesized 
in the ‘RNA world’ scenario (Gilbert 1986) could count as being truly alive or not. For 
some,  such an RNA strand would be capable of replication,  possibly with variation 
thanks to replication errors, and therefore would be subject to natural evolution, hence 
alive (see for instance Luisi 1998). For others, on the contrary,  self-replicating RNA 
strands would be far  from qualifying  as living systems:  at  best  would they be self-
replicating and variation-capable systems; yet they would lack metabolic activity and 
would  also  not  be  enclosed  in  any  membrane-like  compartment  (see  for  instance 
Shapiro 1986, Segré et al. 2001). Similarly, one can imagine the debate about the status 
of a physico-chemical system that would be capable of metabolic activity yet incapable 
of replication; an extreme example could be that of an organism that would comprise a 
planet in its entirety; yet another that of self-sustaining vesicles. One can also question 
whether  a  self-replicating  system  that  would  have  a  compartmentalization  and  a 
metabolic  activity,  but  that  would  be  devoid  of  any  genetic  code,  might  be  called 
‘living’ or not: most likely ‘no’ if one defines life on the basis of a genetic code, and 
‘yes’ if one defines life on the basis of a metabolic activity.  And the debate goes on 
about whether certain particular natural systems should be included or not within the 
restricted circle of ‘living systems’. 
What this debate illustrates, above all, is the wide range of properties and of ways of 
expressing these  properties  that  might  be called  upon to  define  ‘what  it  is  to  live’. 
Indeed, it appears today that the transition from ‘inanimate matter’ to ‘life as we know 
it’ is likely to be a very gradual process, involving multiple steps and spanning over 
millions, if not billions, of years (see for instance de Duve 1991). In this respect, there 
would therefore be no sharp point in time corresponding to the appearance of life: rather 
then  resulting  from  a  sudden  emergence,  ‘life’  is  likely  to  be  the  outcome  of  a 
continuum of ‘more-or-less alive’ systems. Similarly, one can also argue that there still 
exist today physico-chemical systems that could be assessed as being more or less alive 
than other systems (as is the case, for instance, of viruses when compared to archae, 
bacteria  or  eukarya).  In  a  sense  therefore,  there  would  be  no  clear-cut  historical 
transition between non-living and living systems, nor any clear-cut delineation between 
current, be they natural or artificial, non-living and living systems. As a result, it can be 
argued  that  there  are  degrees  of  ‘lifeness’,  that  the  property  of  ‘being  alive’  or  of 
‘pertaining to the class of living systems’ is a matter of degree that cannot be captured 
within a framework resting on classical logic and the law of bivalence, but rather within 
a framework resting on fuzzy- or multi-valued logic (see Bruylants, Bartik and Reisse 
2009,  this  volume):  in  such  a  case,  physico-chemical  systems  may  receive  a  score 
between 0 and 1 representing their degree of being alive. The upshot of the approach is 
to take into account the latest scientific knowledge about the origin of life, that is to say 
the  very  likelihood  of  a  gradual  transition  from  inanimate  matter  to  life,  and  to 
formalize this continuum of ‘lifeness’. Yet, the evaluation of any system along a 0-to-1 
scale seems to imply that being more-or-less alive is a question of degree along a one-
dimensional axis. Yet, is there indeed such a one-dimension along which to be ‘more-
or-less alive’ or rather several dimensions, some of them potentially getting lost when 
projected onto a single axis? 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  system  can  be  more-or-less  successful  at  replicating  or 
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reproducing itself,  or  more-or-less  successful  at  metabolizing  components  or  energy 
tokens from given sets of available nutrients and energy sources, or even endowed with 
a more-or-less sophisticated membrane. For instance, it appears very likely that, over 
time, membranes evolved very much in complexity: the abiotic synthesis of amphiphilic 
molecules, such as fatty acids, and their concentration and self-assembly might have 
resulted  into vesicles,  likely to  be the first  types  of  membranes  encountered  on the 
primitive Earth; yet such vesicles are very sensitive to concentration, temperature and 
pH (e.g. Monnard and Deamer 2002); the addition of other molecules such as sterols or 
amphiphilic polypeptides could have resulted, in a second step, in more robust vesicles, 
stable across varying chemical conditions, and larger as well (e.g. Luisi 2002); in a third 
step,  the insertion  of specialized  transporters  and active  catalysts  might  have led to 
vesicles able to create and maintain chemical disequilibria; and the subsequent additions 
of  other  more  complex  organic  compounds  such  as  polysaccharides,  energy-
transduction  components  or  surface-layers  components  would  have  resulted  in  the 
appearance  of  the  extremely  sophisticated  and multi-function  membranes  of  current 
organisms  (e.g.  Ourisson  and  Nakatami  1994).  One  can  therefore  hypothesize  the 
appearance  of  many  different  types  of  membranes  of  increasing  complexity  and 
performance.  It  might  also  be  the  case  that  only  certain  types  of  membranes  are 
sophisticated enough to host life. In any case, the type of membrane that a particular 
physico-chemical  system has might  lead to qualify this system as more-or-less alive 
depending, in part, on the performance of this type of membrane: for instance, more-or-
less alive because of being more-or-less stable across varying chemical conditions, or 
because of being more-or-less capable of creating a chemical disequilibria etc. Similar 
performance scales could be put together for other major features of living systems: 
more or less efficient catalytic activity, more or less sophisticated metabolic pathways, 
more or less robust informational polymers etc. Such scales may then explain how a 
system might  be more-or-less alive along several dimensions:  for instance,  a system 
might be capable of more-or-less successfully replicating, or more-or-less successfully 
metabolizing components. In addition, it might prove to be the case that in order to be, 
for instance, optimally replicating, one also needs to be successfully metabolizing, i.e. 
that in order to reach higher degrees of ‘lifeness’, then one needs to integrate and couple 
between themselves several of the above-mentioned dimensions.  In sum therefore,  it 
appears that the transition from inanimate matter to life is not a matter of a sudden jump 
but rather a matter of degrees, and that furthermore, such transition is not a matter of 
degrees  along  a  single  dimension  but  rather  along several  dimensions.  As a  result, 
defining ‘life’ becomes less relevant than defining specific ‘types of living systems’ that 
would  characterize  each  of  these  dimensions  and  their  inter-relatedness.  Such  an 
approach could also account for the current plurality of definitions of life. It is also 
commonplace in other fields of human enquiry. For instance, the multiple ways one can 
fly  – more-or-less  successfully!  –  have led  to  a  plurality  of  definitions  of  the  term 
‘aircraft’. 
Different types of ‘what it is to fly’
It  seems one would know what flies and what  doesn’t,  and that there is  a clear-cut 
definition of ‘what it is to fly’: birds fly, as do aircrafts, but stones don’t, neither do 
laptops. Yet, from paper airplanes to long-haul passenger aircrafts, there appears to be a 
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wide  range  of  performance  and  diversity  of  ‘what  it  is  to  fly’.  Dictionary-type 
definitions would say that to fly,  in this semantic context, is “to move or be moved 
through the air by means of wings or a machine”3. Yet, such a generic definition has 
numerous counter-examples: hot-air balloons do not have wings nor a machine, neither 
do dandelion seeds, and yet they do fly. A similar problem arises when defining ‘what it 
is to fly’ as when defining ‘what it is to live’: stipulative definitions of such concepts 
fail to capture all necessary and sufficient conditions in which the terms should apply. 
Yet, a closer look at those ‘flying systems’ tells an interesting story. 
In particular, the study of man-made flying systems – ‘aircrafts’ – reveals a great 
diversity of flying performances or ‘degrees of successfully flying’, to say the least4. For 
instance a propeller aircraft  like the four-seat, single-engine,  fixed-wing  Cessna 172 
Skyhawk, one of the most popular flight training aircraft in the world today, is likely to 
be qualified as a better flying system then the Blériot n° XI  which crossed the Channel 
exactly one hundred years ago5:  both are single engine,  fixed-wing aircrafts,  yet  the 
Cessna can carry more passengers, at a higher altitude and over longer distances than 
the  Blériot could.  One  can  therefore  imagine  a  scale  alongside  of  which  could  be 
measured the degrees of ‘what it is to fly’. Such a scale would take into account a mix 
of flight performance parameters: distance, speed, cargo load or number of passengers, 
energy  consumption,  maintenance  costs,  durability,  handling  in  adverse  weather 
conditions etc. 
A closer look at the story of aviation reveals that there is much more to ‘what it is to 
fly’  than  just  a  single  one-dimensional  flight  performance  scale.  There  are  indeed 
several  drastically  different  dimensions  along  which  such  performance  could  be 
measured,  in short several ways of ‘what it  is to fly’:  one can glide;  one can use a  
propeller  to  generate  thrust  and  dynamic  lift;  or  one  can  also  take  advantage  of 
buoyancy. The existence of such a diversity of means of flying has led to a plurality of 
definitions  of  ‘flying  systems’.  For  instance,  one  can  first  distinguish  between 
‘aerostats’,  such  as  hot-air  balloons,  and  ‘aerodynes’,  such  as  modern  commercial 
airplanes: whereas ‘aerostats’ are lighter than air and can take advantage of buoyancy to 
achieve sustained movement through the air, ‘aerodynes’ are heavier than air and fly 
only by deriving lift from dynamic motion through the air. 
Also,  within  ‘aerodynes’,  one  can  distinguish  those  that  are  powered,  such  as 
propeller airplanes, from those are not, such as gliders. One can also distinguish those 
that have fixed wings from those that have flexible wings, or even those that have rotary 
wings: for instance,  among ‘unpowered aerodynes’,  one can find fixed-wing gliders, 
usually  simply  called  ‘gliders’,  but  also  flexible-wing  gliders  like  so-called  ‘hang 
gliders’ or ‘paragliders’, or even rotary-wing gliders like ‘rotor-kites’ or ‘gyrogliders’. 
A somehow similar, but more complex, classification holds for ‘powered aerodynes’. 
In addition to using fixed-wings, flexible-wings or rotary-wings as means of providing 
lift,  some ‘powered aerodynes’  might  use other  sources of lift,  maybe more or less 
successfully. For instance, ‘ornithopters’ fly by flapping their wings somehow similarly 
3 See for instance the entry ‘Fly’ in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Longman (1981).
4 A similar argument could be made on the basis of naturally occurring flying systems, from birds to  
seeds, to even bacteria in cloud droplets (on the later, see for instance Sattler, Puxbaum, and Psenner 
2001).
5 Blériot crossed the Channel on July 25 th 1909, reaching Dover from Calais in 37 minutes. See for 
instance Winchester (2007).
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to what birds do6; and aircrafts like the ‘flying bedstead’ relies on jet lift, with engine 
thrust directed downwards, as a means of providing lift7.
And there are also hybrid ‘lighter-than-air/heavier-than-air’ aircrafts. Among those 
are hybrid airships that combine characteristics of ‘heavier-than-air’ and ‘lighter-than-
air’ technology,  like helicopter/airship hybrids intended for heavy lift applications or 
dynamic lift airships intended for long-range cruising8.
This brief aeronautical survey illustrates not only that ‘flying systems’ can be more-
or-less flying, i.e. that there are degrees of performance relative to flying, but also that 
flying can be achieved by quite different means and quite different arrangements of 
these means. The existence of some many different ways and degrees of flying has led 
to (1) a rather simple generic high-level definition of ‘what it is to fly’, accompanied by 
(2) dozens of more specific ‘niche’ definitions covering special ways and degrees of 
‘what it is to fly’. And, whereas the high-level definition captures the key features of 
flying  without  the  ambition  to  fence  off  all  possible  counter-examples,  the  niche 
definitions specify much more precisely the types of ‘flying systems’, essentially on the 
basis of their functioning. 
Different types of ‘what it is to live’
In  a  similar  way,  the  plurality  of  definitions  of  life  could  be  accounted  for  by the 
existence of, not only performance degrees of living systems, but also the diversity of 
means and ways  of functioning of such living systems.  As a result,  one should not 
worry so much about finding ‘the’ right definition of life: like the definition of ‘to fly’, 
the definition of ‘to live’ is likely to be prone to countless exceptions, no matter how 
well-crafted such definition might be: the reason is that there appears to be different 
ways thanks to which a chemical system might qualify as living. Instead, focusing on 
the definitions of more precise types of living systems – like one can define types of 
aircrafts – could prove to be more fruitful in terms of heuristics and more accurate in 
terms of carving Nature at its joints.
Indeed,  different  predicates  can be defined to  explicate  ‘what  it  is  to  live’  when 
applied to particular types of physico-chemical systems. For instance, some of the major 
predicates may include:
- Replicating: property of a system that catalyzes the synthesis of systems that are 
identical to itself,
- Vario-replicating: property of a system that catalyzes the synthesis of systems 
that  are  nearly  identical  to  itself  (the  ‘nearly’  could  be  further  specified,  for 
instance 95% molecule-to-molecule identity),
- Metabolizing:  property  of  a  system that  harnesses  energy sources  to  produce 
chemical components while maintaining itself,
- Encoding: property of a chemical system that utilizes a molecular informational 
code, 
6 See for instance www.ornithopter.org
7 This was for instance the case of the Rolls-Royce Thrust Measuring Rig of the 1950s, or the NASA 
Lunar Landing Research Vehicle of the 1960s.
8 For  instance,  one  can  refer  to  the  P-791 of  Looked-Martin  (“Lockheed  Martin's  Secretly  Built 
Airship  Makes  First  Flight”,  Aviation  Week,  5  Feb.  2006)  or  the  Aeroscraft project  of  Aeros 
(www.aerosml.com) among others.
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- Encapsulated: property of a chemical system that possesses a membrane which, 
in turn, provides a degree of isolation of the system from the environment, etc.
Accordingly, as a matter of illustration, the RNA-world would be populated by ‘vario-
replicating systems’; on the other hand, hydrothermal vents might have given birth to 
‘metabolizing  systems’;  and  a  current  unicellular  organism  would  qualify  as  an 
‘encapsulated  metabolizing  encoding  and  vario-replicating  system’.  Of  course,  the 
precise  definitions  of  each  predicate  can  be  fine-tuned,  as  well  as  the  list  of  these 
predicates. In addition, more fine-grained predicates could be devised to capture further 
distinctions between types of ‘living systems’, as scientific investigations reveal them. 
For instance, in the case of energy appropriation, one could define (on the basis of e.g. 
Popa 2004):
- Catalytic:  property  of  a  chemical  system  that  catalyzes  specific  chemical  
reactions,
- Autocatalytic:  property  of  a  chemical  system that  catalyzes  specific  chemical  
reactions, some of which catalyze in turn the synthesis/restoration of the initial  
catalysts (reflexive activity),
- Energy-transducing:  property  of  a  chemical  system  that  can  transform  one  
energy form into another energy form (and potentially store energy),
- Energy-regulating: property of a chemical system that can regulate the pace of  
energy flow.
Of course such definitions are still largely open and upcoming scientific research will 
tell which specific predicates are the most suited to describe the types of living systems 
(it is advances and failures in aeronautics that have revealed which ways of flying were 
possible and also more effective, and that have therefore shaped the predicates used to 
describe the great diversity of flying systems: aerostat/aerodyne, powered/unpowered, 
fixed-wing/flexible-wing/rotary-wing etc.). In any case, I argue that there are, at least, 
three major reasons for focusing on defining ‘types of living systems’, and no longer on 
defining the higher-level property of ‘life’. 
First,  defining  and  explicating  types  of  living  systems  should  facilitate 
communication  of  scientific  results,  between  scientists  (in  particular  of  different 
disciplines), as well as between the scientific community and the general audience (for 
instance in order to avoid hastily reached conclusions of the sort ‘the secret of life has 
been discovered’ or ‘traces of life have been discovered on Mars’). This should also 
help laypersons realize how complex the transition from inanimate matter to life can be, 
and which  key functions  are  required  for  a  chemical  system to  gradually reach the 
performance of some of the most basic living systems.
Second, focusing on types of living systems and their key properties may have a 
heuristic  value  as  it  may  help  map  out  and  investigate  alternative  ways  of  putting 
together life-contributing functions: after all, it is not by copying Nature and the flight 
of birds that man best managed to fly, but by devising a ‘powered fixed-wing aircraft’;  
as  a  matter  of  fact,  man-made  ornithopters  proved  much  more  complex  to  build; 
furthermore,  focusing  on  buoyancy  instead  of  dynamic  lift  made  possible  the  first 
manned free-flights in hot-air  balloons a century before the first flights in ‘powered 
fixed-wing aircrafts’9. Similarly copying Nature may not prove to be the best way for 
9 The first recorded free flight with human passengers onboard a hot-air balloon was on November 21, 
1783 when de Rozier, along with Marquis Francois d'Arlandes,  flew the balloon built by the brothers 
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synthetic biology to make headway in creating novel in vitro living systems.
Third, such a pluralistic definitional strategy might also prove to be a more truthful 
way to carve Nature at its joints: the wide diversity of definitions of life as well as the 
numerous debates between scientists about the relative importance of specific sets of 
properties or models over others might indeed be interpreted as pointing, if anything, 
towards the existence of different ways and degrees of ‘what it is to live’. 
Conclusion
In this contribution, I proposed that two arguments can help explain the existence of a 
plurality of definitions of life: first a ‘methodological argument’ related to the diversity 
of possible methods of definition, and second a ‘natural argument’ stemming from the 
diversity of properties exhibited by border-line systems in between inanimate matter 
and  life.  Whereas,  for  some,  the  plurality  of  definitions  of  life  is  perceived  as  an 
unsatisfying  situation  that  is  to  be  remedied,  I  proposed  that  focusing,  instead,  on 
defining types of living systems might prove more fruitful and accurate as a way of 
accounting not only for different degrees of ‘lifeness’ or ‘living performance’, but also 
of accounting for the different means that physico-chemical systems might manage to 
harness in order to live. Like flying,  living might indeed come not only in different 
intensities but also in different flavors.
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